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In this paper, I analyse the association between workplace sex ratios and part-
nership formation and dissolution. I ￿nd that the risk of dissolution increases with
the fraction of coworkers of the opposite sex at both the female and male workplace.
On the other hand, workplace sex ratios are not important for the overall transition
rate from singlehood to partnership. The results suggest that the workplace consti-
tutes a more important marriage market segment for individuals who are already
in a partnership presumably due to higher search cost for (alternative) partners in
general.
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11 Introduction
There is ample evidence that romantic workplace interactions are quite common. Based
on a US survey conducted in 1992, Laumann et al. (1994) report that 15% of married
couples and 18% of cohabiting couples met their current partner in the workplace. ¯berg
(2003) reports that a Swedish survey conducted in 1996 shows that 20% of Swedish adults
met their current partner in the workplace. In a Dutch Survey from 1995, 8% reported to
have meet their current partner at work (Kalmijn & Flap (2001)). In the data set used in
the current study, which is based on Danish register data, around 7% of the partnership1
formations occur between individuals who work for the same ￿rm.
The probability of ￿nding a suitable match at work presumably depends on the work-
place composition. A number of studies have shown how the sex ratio in the local mar-
riage market a⁄ects both partnership formation and dissolution (e.g. Lichter et al. (1991),
Fitzgerald (1991), South & Lloyd (1992, 1995), Brien (1997), Cready et al. (1997), and
Angrist (2002)).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the sex ratio in the workplace a⁄ects
marriage market behavior. The project exploits ￿rm and workplace level data to investi-
gate how partnership formation and dissolution evolves for a group of Danish individuals.
In terms of analyzing partnership formation from the perspective of workplace inter-
actions, the author of this paper does not know any other literature that address this
aspect, whereas the association between sex ratios in the workplace and the risk of di-
vorce are analyzed in (at least) three other studies. Both ¯berg (2003) and McKinnish
(2004, 2006) provide evidence that married individuals working in ￿rms or occupations
where the fraction of workers of the opposite sex is high have an increased risk of divorce.
In relation the latter studies, this paper also contributes to the literature on work-
place composition and divorce. Compared to McKinnish (2004, 2006) who use industry-
occupation level data I have access to much more precise information on the actual sex
ratio of the workplace. Also, compared to ¯berg (2003) the data set used in this pa-
per o⁄ers notable improvements, primarily because ¯berg (2003) only investigates formal
marriages. This implies that she ignores cohabitation which is a highly common partner-
ship form in Sweden. According to the UN Economic Commission for Europe Fertility
and Family Surveys, less than 10% of Swedes marry directly without prior cohabitation.
1Throughout the paper a partnership can be either cohabitation or marriage.
2Also, a large fraction of relationships consists of cohabiting couples who never marry. In
addition, the data set enables me to identify whether a new match is formed between two
persons who prior to partnership formation, worked for the same employer. This makes
it possible to get a more clear test of one of the main mechanisms through which the
sex ratio at the workplace a⁄ects marriage market behavior. Namely, ￿nding of a (new)
partner at work.
The main ￿nding of the paper is that the risk of dissolution increases with the fraction
of coworkers of the opposite sex at both the female and male workplace. On the other
hand, workplace sex ratios are not important in relation to partnership formation for single
individuals. I argue that these results are consistent with a simple search model in which
the costs of searching for partners increase if an individual is already in a partnership, and
accordingly that the workplace becomes more important as a marriage market segment. In
fact, the data set used in the present analysis support this presumption since the fraction
of individuals who leave a partnership to form a new relationship with a coworker is twice
the size of the fraction of single individuals who form a partnership with a colleague.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 I give a brief description of
related theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 present the data. In Section 4 the
empirical model is outlined. Section 5 and 6 give the results of the partnership formation
and partnership dissolution analyses, respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
It has for some time been recognized that sex ratios are important for marriage market
outcomes. Both Becker (1973), Keeley (1977), and Oppenheimer (1988) emphasize that
marriage timing is a function of available partners and therefore that women marry faster
if living in a male dominated marriage market and vice versa for men. Empirically, it has
also been established that sex ratios a⁄ect both marriage formation and dissolution (see
e.g. South & Lloyd (1992, 1995) and Angrist (2002)). Whereas these and related studies
have investigated the e⁄ect of sex ratio in a geographically restricted area on marriage
market outcomes, the purpose of the current study is to narrow the measure of sex ratios
even further. I investigate the e⁄ect of sex ratio in the workplace on marriage market
outcomes.
3It is useful to approach the topic from a search theoretical perspective along the
lines of e.g. Oppenheimer (1988) and Mortensen (1988). Any given individual might
occupy one of two states: single or married2. In both states, partnership search can take
place. It is however obvious that searching for a new partner while already in a marriage
might be more expensive than searching when single. This observation is important for
the present analysis, since I am focusing on workplace encounters and since workplaces
presumably constitute a larger part of the potential marriage markets for married persons
than for singles. With this is mind, I imagine that individuals search for partners to
marry. Marriage o⁄ers arrive at a ￿nite rate. The decision to accept a given marriage
proposal depends on the expected return to the current partnership compared to continued
search for another partner. In standard stationary search models, the optimal behavior
for individuals is to follow a reservation level strategy, where the ￿rst individual who
proposes marriage and has a quality that satis￿es the reservation level is accepted. For a
given reservation level, an increase in the number of potential partners will increase the
probability of marriage. In this case I expect that individuals who are working in ￿rms
with a higher fraction of employees of the opposite sex are more likely to ￿nd a (new)
partner. As workplace encounters are assumed to be more important for individuals
already married (due to the higher cost of searching in other segments of the marriage
market), I expect this e⁄ect to be more pronounced for married individuals than for single
individuals. Clearly, individuals might increase their reservation level when they realize
that the arrival rate of marriage o⁄ers increases (they become more choosy). A higher
reservation level has an o⁄setting e⁄ect on the probability of observing a match. In the job
search literature it has been shown that the former e⁄ect dominates for most parametric
con￿guration of the distribution of o⁄ers (e.g. van den Berg (1994)). In light of this
literature, I expect to ￿nd a positive association between sex ratios in the workplace and
partnership formation for both single and married people, where the e⁄ect for married
people in terms of divorce is expected to be more pronounced.
As mentioned earlier, there is a number of studies that have shown how the sex ratio in
the local marriage market a⁄ects both partnership formation and dissolution (e.g. Lichter
et al. (1991), Fitzgerald (1991), South & Lloyd (1992, 1995), Brien (1997), Cready et al.
(1997), and Angrist (2002)). In terms of looking at the workplace as an isolated marriage
2We will use the term married for both cohabiting and formally married couples.
4market, the literature is more slim. Below I give a detailed account of the existing studies
I have been able to locate, i.e. ¯berg (2003) and McKinnish (2004, 2006).
¯berg (2003) approaches the subject from a sociological angle and wishes to inves-
tigate how social context a⁄ects the risk of divorce. Her measure of social context is
based on coworker characteristics. She argues that coworker characteristics can a⁄ect
divorce decisions through four mechanisms; opportunity-based mechanisms, belief-based
mechanisms, desire-based mechanisms, and trigger mechanisms. The ￿rst relates to the
observation that increased access to alternative partners increases the likelihood of ￿nding
a better match than the current. This intuition is empirically supported by studies by
Udry (1981) and South & Lloyd (1995). The belief-based mechanism emphasizes that the
decision to divorce is taken under imperfect information. It is not perfectly predictable
how ones life will be after a divorce. It is, however, possible to gather information from
already divorced colleagues on the expected outcome. Accordingly, the more divorcees
a person encounters in the workplace, the more likely is the person, according to ¯berg
(2003), to divorce. The desire-based mechanism works through social norms. Although
a person might desire to divorce, he/she be deterred from doing so if social norms are
against it. Again, a social network with a large amount of divorcees would presumably
increase the probability that the desire to divorce dominates the social norm not to. The
trigger mechanism relates to the observation that even though the value of marriage com-
pared to either singlehood or marriage to another partner is low, the ￿nal decision to
divorce can be accelerated by some trigger event. ¯berg (2003) suggests that a possible
trigger event could be the news of someone else￿ s divorce. Again, the empirical prediction
from this mechanism corroborates the earlier predictions.
To justify the use of workplace characteristics as a proxy for social context or social
network ¯berg (2003) states that, according to a Swedish study, 50% of all employed
persons socialize with their colleagues during o⁄-hours. In addition, a Finish survey
conducted in 1992 reveals that among married persons 49% of men and 40% of women
had at least once fallen in love with a colleague or another person they met at work
(Kontula & Haavio-Mannila (1995)).
¯berg (2003) uses the 1991 Swedish Establishment Survey, which is a representative
sample of workplaces. ¯berg￿ s analysis uses annual information on around 37,000 indi-
viduals with workplace information from the years 1988-1995. Using a Cox proportional
5hazard model, she estimates how various workplace and individual characteristics a⁄ect
the divorce risk. Two caveats are worth mentioning. First, she only considers formal
marriages. This implies that she ignores cohabitation which is a highly common partner-
ship form in Sweden. According to the UN Economic Commission for Europe Fertility
and Family Surveys,3 less than 10% of Swedes marry directly without prior cohabitation.
Also, a large fraction of relationships consist of cohabiting couples who never marry. Sec-
ond, she uses information of the complete marriage for individuals in the sample although
it is only conditional on observable characteristics in the period 1988-95. In essence,
she has left-truncated durations (on top of that which arises from discarding periods of
cohabitation prior to marriage), and it is not obvious that she controls for this in the
estimation.
Her ￿ndings corroborate expectations: the divorce risk increases with the proportion
of coworkers of the opposite sex and of appropriate age (15 years older and 5 years younger
for women, and 5 years older and 15 years younger for men) and also with the proportion
of coworkers that are divorced themselves. ¯berg (2003) concludes that "..a person is
70% more likely to divorce if all her coworkers are of the opposite sex and of appropriate
age, compared to when all coworkers are either of the same sex, or are too old or too
young to be interesting as potential partners..".
McKinnish (2004, 2006)4 uses the U.S. 1990 Census to calculate the fraction of workers
that are female by industry-occupation cells. These fractions are then used as regressors
in two di⁄erent models.
The ￿rst model is a linear regression model where the dependent variable is an indi-
cator variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is currently divorced in the 1990
Census and 0 otherwise. The ￿nding from the basic model is that women who work in
more female dominated industry-occupation cells are less likely to divorce. The same
results are found for men working primarily with other men, although this e⁄ect is sta-
tistically insigni￿cant. There are a number of cautions to this model. First, the sex-mix
at the workplace might di⁄er from that of the worker￿ s industry-occupation cell. Second,
3The country speci￿c surveys contain between 1700 and 6000 females and are collected at di⁄erent
times in the di⁄erent countries ranging from 1988 to 1999. For more information on these surveys see
http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/⁄s and Svarer (2004).
4The two papers address the same topic. In the following, attention is devoted to the more elaborate
2006 version.
6McKinnish (2006) rightfully argues that the choice of industry-occupation cell might be
endogenous to the divorce process. It is, however, not obvious in which way the estimates
are biased if endogeneity is not addressed. For example, women working in more male
dominated industry-occupation cells might be more independent and less family-oriented
and will be more prone to divorce regardless of exposure to alternative mates. On the
other hand, women working in more male dominated industry-occupation cells might have
a higher level of education, and since level of education traditionally is inversely related to
divorce, they might be less likely to divorce. To address the endogeneity issue, McKinnish
(2006) uses two di⁄erent strategies. First, she augments the basic model with industry-
occupation ￿xed e⁄ects to remove any unobserved industry and occupation characteristics.
The results are in accordance with the basic model, but now the e⁄ect for males becomes
statistically signi￿cant. Second, McKinnish (2006) pursues a IV strategy in which the
industrial and occupational composition of employment in the local labour market is used
as an instrument. The results from this analysis show even stronger e⁄ects than the two
previous models. That is, both men and women working in industry-occupation cells with
a high fraction of workers of the opposite sex have an increased risk of divorce. Assuming
that the IV technique works, this suggests that it is not more divorce prone individuals
who seek employment in industries with a lot of alternative marriage partners.
The second model exploits NLSY79 data to construct a panel data set based on in-
formation for the years 1979-2000. The sex-mix information is still based on Census
data from 1980 and 1990. Hence, while the sex-mix measure for a given occupation only
changes once (at the switch from using the 1980 to the 1990 Census), the individual￿ s
occupation is recorded at each interview so the sex-mix they experience can change from
year to year. Compared to the ￿rst model presented above, the data set is now sub-
stantially smaller. This has implications for the results. McKinnish (2006) was not able
to successfully implement neither the ￿xed-e⁄ect nor the IV strategy. The results found
(which are based both on OLS and a discrete-time hazard model) show that the expected
e⁄ect is found for women, but that the e⁄ect for men is statistically insigni￿cant although
pointing in the right direction.
The ￿ndings in McKinnish (2006) suggest that industry-occupation sex-mix is quite
important for divorce risk. Moving a woman from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile
of fraction of female in industry-occupation cell decreases the probability of divorce by
73.7 percentage points in the OLS model5. With a mean divorce rate of 19.4 percent this
constitutes a 20 percent change in divorce risk. For men the results are signi￿cantly
smaller.
In sum, both ¯berg (2003) and McKinnish (2004, 2006) provide evidence that work-
place sex ratios matter for divorce (although McKinnish￿ s measure is somewhat inaccurate,
since she does not have workplace data). ¯berg (2003) does not address the potential
endogeneity issue of sex composition. When McKinnish (2006) uses ￿xed-e⁄ects or IV
techniques to account for endogeneity, she ￿nds results that are in accordance with the
model in which sex ratios are treated as exogenous. In particular, she ￿nds that for
women the magnitude of the explanatory variable decreases for the ￿xed-e⁄ect estimator
compared to the OLS version, whereas it increases for the IV model. For men, both the
￿xed-e⁄ect and the IV lead to larger e⁄ects of sex-ratios on divorce risks. The former ￿nd-
ing raises doubt that the endogeneity issue is satisfactorily handled. On the other hand,
taken at face value McKinnish￿ s results do not suggest that more divorce prone people
are more likely to seek employment in places where the number of alternative partners is
high.
3 Data
The data set used in the present analysis come from IDA (Integrated Database for Labour
Market Research) created by Statistics Denmark. The information comes from various
administrative registers that are merged in Statistics Denmark. The IDA sample used here
contains (among other things) information on marriage market conditions for a randomly
drawn sub-sample of all individuals born between January 1, 1955 and January 1, 1965.
The individuals are followed from 1980 to 1995. The data set enables us to identify
individual transitions between di⁄erent states on the marriage market on an annual basis.
In addition, the data set contains a number of demographic, socioeconomic, and workplace
related variables for each individual. If a person from the sample forms a partnership
5McKinnish (2005) also reports IV results that show that the divorce risk decreases by 80% when mov-
ing a woman from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of fraction of female in industry-occupation
cell. In light of the discussion in the returns-to-schooling literature and IV estimation (see e.g. Card
(2001)), this ￿nding should be interpreted with great caution. Especially since the ￿xed-e⁄ect results
(also reported in the article) show much smaller e⁄ects.
8I also have information on a number individual characteristics of the partner. When
the partnership ends the data set do not follow the partner and there is no available
information on the marriage market history that follows after a break with an individual
from the original sample.
The main variable of interest is the fraction of workers of opposite sex at the workplace.
This number is simply calculated as the number of workers of the opposite sex divided
by the total number of employees at the workplace each year6. A workplace is de￿ned
as a unit of a ￿rm which has its own address and produces a given good or service. In
comparison, the label ￿￿rm￿ is used for a legal entity that encompasses one or more
workplaces. The data set contains information on the number of male and female workers
on both workplace and ￿rm level. In terms of the issue of interest in this paper, which is
proximity of potential partners, the workplace level data presumably o⁄er a more direct
measure of the group of individuals that surrounds the unit of observation than ￿rm level
data do. It is not all working individuals that have a workplace identi￿cation number.
This occurs if individuals perform a task that does not take place at a given workplace.
I.e. taxi drivers, cleaning personal, insurance salesmen, and all other individuals who do
not have a ￿xed address at which they perform their job. Although these individuals
might be in contact with a workplace and meet others through this contact, information
on the sex ratio of their workplace is missing. In the following, the fraction of workers
of the opposite sex for these individuals as well as for individuals who are out of work
at the moment of observation is set to 0. To distinguish from workers who do not have
coworkers of the opposite sex I include a indicator variable which takes the value 1 if the
fraction of coworkers is missing and 0 otherwise.
In Figure 1 the distribution of the fraction of coworkers of the opposite sex is presented.
6The distribution of ￿rm size in Denmark is very right-skewed. There is a majority of smaller entities.
In around 40% of the workplaces in the sample individuals have less than 10 colleagues of the opposite
sex and around 70% have less than 50. The median number of coworkers of the opposite sex is 16 for
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Figure 1: Distribution of fraction of coworkers of the opposite sex.
The pattern is consistent with McKinnish (2006) for the US and shows that the labour
market to some extent is segmented according to sex.
I perform two sets of analysis in the paper. First, I look at partnership formation
and how workplace sex ratio a⁄ects the transition from singlehood to cohabitation or
marriage. Second, I investigate the issue of partnership dissolution. I present the relevant
explanatory variables for the di⁄erent analyses as I move along.
4 Empirical strategy
In both the partnership formation analysis and partnership dissolution analysis I use
duration models. Based on the available information I construct two types of spells: single
spells and partnership spells. The ￿rst type starts when an individual ends a partnership.
I then follow the individuals over time until they ￿nd a new partner or the observation
periods end. In the latter case the spell is right censored. This strategy implies that I
delete all left censored spell. For individuals who start the observation period as single
I have no information on how long time the elapsed duration has been and I therefore
ignore these observations in the analysis7. I follow the same strategy for the partnership
dissolution analysis. Here I sample all individuals who enter a relationship either as
7I also conduct the analysis including left censored observation to get a picture of how sensitive the
results are to the omission of these observations.
10cohabiting or married and follow then until the partnership ends or the sample periods
stop. Both procedures give a ￿ ow sample of single spell/partnerships. The duration model
is speci￿ed as a mixed proportional hazard model. That is, it is a product of a function of
time spent in the relationship (the baseline hazard), a function of observed time-varying
characteristics, x, and a function of unobserved characteristics, v;
h(tjxt;v) = ￿(t) ￿ ’(xt;v); (1)
where ￿(t) is the baseline hazard and ’(xt;v) is the scaling function speci￿ed as exp(x0
t￿+
v).
Since I only observe the transitions on the marriage market on a yearly basis, I specify
a model for grouped duration data (see e.g. Kiefer (1990)). The marriage duration T
is observed to lie in one of K intervals, with the k￿ th interval being (tk￿1;tk] and the
convention t0 = 0 for k = 1;:::;15. The probability that the duration T for an individual
with explanatory variables xt is greater than tk given that the duration is greater than
tk￿1 is given by:










tk￿1 ￿i(t)dt. The interval-speci￿c survivor expression (2) is henceforth
denoted ￿k: The probability of observing an exit out of marriage in interval k; conditional
on survival until T > tk￿1; is consequently 1 ￿ ￿k. If I do not specify a functional form
for the baseline hazard, the ￿i;ks are just parameters to be estimated.










where g(v) is the probability density function of the unobservables and where j = 1 if
the marriage is not right censored and 0 otherwise. Uncompleted durations therefore only
contribute with the survivor probabilities. g(v) is assumed to follow a discrete distribution
with two points of support.
In relation to the partnership formation analysis I also consider a competing risks
speci￿cation where I distinguish between single spells that end because an individuals
￿nd a partner at work and spells that end when a partner outside work is located. The
11empirical model is then augmented accordingly. Let ji (i = w(work);nw(not work))
denote the destination speci￿c indicator. That is jw equals 1 when an individuals forms a
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As mentioned in the previous section, workplace information is missing for part of the
sample. For these individuals the probability of ￿nding a partner at work is obviously
zero. I address this issue by restricting the cause-speci￿c hazard into partnership with a
coworker to zero in the likelihood function. That is, they do not contribute to this part
of the model.
5 Analysis of partnership formation
The main interest here is to investigate whether the probability of exiting a single spell
is a⁄ected by the fraction of coworkers of the opposite sex. In addition, I also distinguish
between partnerships with a coworker and with a non-coworker. The distribution of the
dependent variable is as follows:
No. of single spells 20565
No. of these:
- that are right censored 10343
- that ￿nd partner at workplace 800
- that ￿nd partner at ￿rm 1188
Around 5% (7%) of the partnerships formed are among coworkers from the same
workplace (￿rm). There are good reasons to believe that this number underestimates
12the true number of partnerships formed between colleagues8. Some ￿rms have a policy
of not employing couples, which may cause newly matched individuals to change jobs.
In addition, if two individuals are employed at the same workplace, but the workplace
does not have an identi￿cation number, they do not count as coworkers. Also, the data
set cannot identify all partnership formations that take place in the sample, since I only
consider partnerships formed by single individuals in this part of the paper. The reason
why I focus on singles is that it provides a clear view of how workplace sex ratios a⁄ect this
group compared to the group of individuals who are already in a relationship and for whom
the workplace presumably constitutes a larger segment of their search environment9.
In addition to information on workplace sex ratios, I use a range of other time-varying
explanatory variables to describe partnership formation. Following the empirical marriage
formation literature (e.g. South & Lloyd (1992)), I include information on age (and age
squared), income, education, children and occupation. The income variable measures
gross annual income and includes wage income, capital gains and public transfers. The
income variable is de￿ ated with the consumer price index and is measured in 1980 prices.
I include 4 educational level dummies. The reference group is less than high school.
Vocational education refers to individuals that have some sort of practical training, such
as carpenters etc. The other categories refer to di⁄erent levels of further education.
Short cycle further education includes people who have studied for 14 years in total,
individuals in the medium cycle further education category have studied for 16 years and
long cycle further education includes people who have studied for at least 18 years. I
also have an indicator variable for individuals currently attending education. I include an
indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the person has children. Finally, there are two
occupational dummies: white collar workers and blue collar workers, where the reference
group consists of individuals who are either unskilled or not employed.
In Table 1, I present descriptive statistics and the results from the partnership analysis.
8If I only consider individuals with workplace information I ￿nd that of those who ￿nd a partner 9,4%
￿nd a partner at the workplace and 12% ￿nd a partner in the ￿rm in which they work. These number
are closer to the ones reported by Laumann et al. (1994) and ¯berg (2003).
9In the partnership dissolution analysis in Section 6 I address the issue of partnership dissolution that
are followed by a new relationship with a coworker.
13Table 1
Descriptives and results from partnership formation analysis
Means Transition to Transition to
partnership partnership with:
Coworker Other
Fraction of coworkers of opposite sex 0.203 0.033 2.339￿￿ -0.144￿￿
0.248 0.046 0.172 0.049
Workplace information missing 0.429 -0.098￿￿ - -0.120￿￿
0.024 0.025
Age (/100 in duration model) 24.85 6.826￿￿ -0.176 6.713￿￿
5.978 0.429 9.273 0.436
Age squared (/1000 in duration model) 653.18 -1.732￿￿ -0.358 -1.714￿￿
284.35 0.096 1.710 0.098
Children 0.222 -0.257￿￿ -0.285￿￿ -0.258￿￿
0.022 0.105 0.022
Income (in 100,000 DKK) 0.766 0.182￿￿ 0.648￿￿ 0.163￿￿
0.565 0.017 0.101 0.017
White Collar 0.319 0.109￿￿ 0.284￿￿ 0.105￿￿
0.021 0.098 0.022
Blue Collar 0.108 0.029 0.184 0.022
0.029 0.140 0.030
Vocational education 0.407 0.124￿￿ 0.082 0.127￿￿
0.019 0.093 0.019
Short cycle further education 0.039 0.139￿￿ 0.202 0.138￿￿
0.044 0.175 0.046
Medium cycle further education 0.035 0.219￿￿ 0.289￿ 0.206￿￿
0.045 0.164 0.047
Long cycle further education 0.026 0.151￿￿ -0.329 0.164￿￿
0.052 0.218 0.054
Currently attending education 0.274 -0.164￿￿ -0.333￿￿ -0.162￿￿
0.020 0.108 0.021
No. of spells 20656
Mean duration (in years) 4.034
Note: ￿ (￿￿) indicates signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level.
Standard deviations (descriptives) and standard errors in italics.
The results presented in Table 110 are in strong accordance with expectations. For
the explanatory variables traditionally used in empirical matching analysis, I ￿nd that
10The estimated baseline hazard coe¢ cients and the unobserved heterogeneity components are not
reported in the table. The baseline hazard shows a declining hazard rate and the inclusion of the
unobserved heterogenity terms did not improve the ￿t of the model. The results presented are from a
model without unobserved heterogeneity. In addition, I have also estimated versions of the models where
I distinguish between men and women, where I include the confounding variables in sequential order,
where I investigate random e⁄ects version of the models, where I included left censored observations,
and where I used fraction of coworkers of the opposite sex at the ￿rm level as well as interaction e⁄ects
between fraction of coworkers of opposite sex and ￿rm size as explanatory variable. Since the main results
were una⁄ected by these elaborations, I only report the results from the basic model. Results from the
alternative speci￿cations are of course available upon request.
14the transition rate to partnership is higher for individuals being more educated, richer
and higher ranked in terms of occupation11. The presence of children is perhaps not the
best attribute a person can bring to a new relationship. Accordingly, the matching rate
is lower for individuals with children from previous relationships. Currently attending
college is also not a characteristic that enhances the instantaneous probability of ￿nding
a partner. This association could be due to ￿nancial constraints in terms of acquiring
housing, and it could also re￿ ect the age dimension, i.e. that individuals tend to wait
after they have ￿nished their education before they settle down with a partner.
I ￿nd that the fraction of coworkers of the opposite sex does not a⁄ect the instanta-
neous probability of ￿nding a partner. This suggests that for single people, workplaces
do not constitute the most important marriage market segment, and that they are using
other arenas to ￿nd partners. In addition, individuals with missing workplace informa-
tion are less likely to ￿nd a partner. This probably re￿ ects that this group on average
have worse characteristics than individuals with workplace information12. Despite the fact
that I do take level of education, income and age e⁄ects into account, I still ￿nd that this
group have a harder job ￿nding a spouse. One reason for missing workplace information
is that individuals are outside the labour market. In light of Becker (1973), it could be
argued that due to household specialization gains, individuals who are not active in the
labour market could be more attractive partners than individuals who work. There is,
however, ample evidence that there is positive assortative matching in income ￿also after
correcting for level of education (see. e.g. Nakosteen & Zimmer (2001) and Gautier et al.
(2005)).
Turning to the last columns of Table 1 where a distinction is made between leaving the
single state to form a partnership with a partner who is also a colleague as opposed to a
person who is not a colleague, I ￿nd that the fraction of coworkers of the opposite sex has
a strongly positive e⁄ects on the transition into partnerships with a coworker and a small
negative e⁄ect on the transition into partnerships with a person that is not a colleague.
That is, even though the overall transition rate into partnership is not signi￿cantly a⁄ected
11These results are in accordance with other studies on partnership formation (see e.g. Aassve et al
(2002) and Xie et al. (2003)).
12Investigating the di⁄erences in the personal characteristics for individuals with workplace information
compared to those without, I ￿nd that the latter group on average have lower levels of education, lower
income, and are younger.
15by the workplace sex mix, the result do suggests that the workplace does serve as a local
marriage market, and that the gender mix at work does matter for partnership formation.
In terms of the literature on sex ratios in the local marriage market it is reassuring that
the probability of ￿nding a partner at work increases in the relative supply of potential
partners.
In terms of the quality of partners, I argued earlier that an increase in the arrival
rate of partnership o⁄ers could a⁄ect the acceptance set of individuals. An individual
who works in a workplace with a large fraction of colleagues of the opposite sex could
become more choosy. One way to investigate whether this is indeed the case is to analyze
the stability of partnerships that occur between colleagues as opposed to those that form
between individuals who did not meet at their place of work. The next section addresses
partnership dissolution.
6 Analysis of partnership dissolution
Having established that workplace sex ratios are not paramount to partnership formation
for singles, the next step is to analyze how it a⁄ects the duration of relationships. Based on
the previous ￿ndings by ¯berg (2003) and McKinnish (2004, 2006), I expect workplace sex
ratio to have a positive e⁄ect on dissolutions, since the workplace presumably constitutes a
more important marriage market segment for individuals who are already in a relationship.
Some of the included explanatory variables in this part of the paper are identical to
the variables used in the partnership formation analysis. The additional variables are
described below13. I distinguish between cohabiting relationships and marriages by the
indicator married. A variable indicating the order of relationship the individual cur-
rently occupies is measured by the relationship number variable.14 This takes the value
1, if it is the ￿rst relationship in which the unit of observation is registered. Subsequent
relationships with di⁄erent partners raise this number. The variable, sickness, is an in-
13The choice of explanatory variables is decided partly by what is available in the data set and partly
by what is typically used as explanatory variables in the empirical divorce literature (see e.g. Becker et
al. (1979) and Svarer (2004)).
14The measurement of the variable is a little dubious since I only have the information on previous
partners for individuals who were originally in the sample. For their partners I do not know their previous
relationship history.
16dicator variable taking the value 1 if the individual receives sickness bene￿ts for at least
13 weeks during the year. I also distinguish between individuals living in the Copen-
hagen metropolitan area and individuals living in the provinces by the indicator variable
province. I include each individual￿ s annual degree of unemployment. This variable is
de￿ned as the number of hours of unemployment divided by the number of potential
supplied working hours.
I also include variables to capture the likeness of couples. In terms of education, I
include two indicator variables that show whether the partners have the same level of
education or if the male part is more educated15. In terms of age, I include indicator
variables to show the age di⁄erence. I use a dummy for females being more than 4 years
older and vice versa for males being 4 years older. I have three time-varying indicator
variables for the presence of children. These are, ￿rst child, second child and third+
children.
In Table 2 descriptive statistics and results for the dissolution analysis are presented.
15To avoid problems with multicollinearity, I only include educational level and age of the male. There
is a large amount of literature that shows very high levels of positive assortative matching both in terms
of education and age. Gautier et al. (2005) ￿nd a bivariate correlation of 0.48 between years of education
for Danish couples. Similar levels are found for other countries.
17Table 2
Descriptive statistics and results for dissolution model
Descriptivesa Dissolution hazard
Mean Std. Dev. Coe⁄. Std. err.
Fraction of coworkers of opposite sex for female 0.249 0.267 0.343￿￿ 0.063
Workplace information missing for female 0.364 0.204￿￿ 0.036
Fraction of coworkers of opposite sex for male 0.207 0.241 0.307￿￿ 0.065
Workplace information missing for male 0.371 0.173￿￿ 0.034
Same workplace at time of partnership start 0.061 -0.154￿￿ 0.059
Married 0.098 -1.114￿￿ 0.038
Relationship number 1.371 0.102￿￿ 0.029
Living outside Copenhagen 0.601 -0.349￿￿ 0.026
Children (at last year of relationship)
First 0.48 -0.514￿￿ 0.036
Second 0.26 -0.010 0.054
Third + 0.05 -0.102 0.140
Age
Male between 15-20 0.462 0.018 0.067
Male between 21-25 0.326 -0.058 0.054
Male between 26-30 0.143 -0.010 0.045
Female more than 4 years older 0.051 0.467￿￿ 0.059
Male more than 4 years older 0.256 0.208￿￿ 0.035
Education, male
Vocational 0.501 -0.316￿￿ 0.032
Short cycle further 0.049 -0.321￿￿ 0.058
Medium cycle further 0.065 -0.484￿￿ 0.056
Long cycle further 0.079 -0.456￿￿ 0.056
Couple has same level of education 0.463 0.078￿￿ 0.031
Male more educated 0.298 0.206￿￿ 0.039
Income, in 100,000 DKK 1980 prices
Female 0.584 0.362 -0.316￿￿ 0.041
Male 0.882 0.539 -0.269￿￿ 0.025
Sickness and unemployment
Sickness, female 0.098 0.076￿￿ 0.032
Sickness, male 0.105 0.055￿ 0.033
Unemployment rate, female 0.124 0.141￿￿ 0.047
Unemployment rate, male 0.105 0.401￿￿ 0.052
Number of couples 19471
Mean duration 6.881
Dissolutions 0.369
Note: a: Descriptives are measured at ￿rst year of relationship.
￿ (￿￿) indicates signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 at the 10% (5%) level
The results presented in Table 216 show that the risk of divorce increases with the
fraction of coworkers of the opposite sex at both spouses￿workplace. The e⁄ect on the
16The estimated baseline hazard coe¢ cients and the unobserved heterogeneity components are not
reported in the table. The baseline hazard shows a declining hazard rate (as in Svarer (2004, 2005)),
and the unobserved heterogenity terms are statistically signi￿cant. Their presence, however, have no
in￿ uence on the main results. In addition, I have estimated versions of the dissolution model with
di⁄erent con￿gurations of the explanatory variables. It turned out that the e⁄ect of workplace gender
composition was not sensitive to this. I therefore only present the main model. Also, I allowed for
18dissolution risk from working in a workplace with no coworkers of the opposite sex com-
pared to a workplace where all coworkers are of the same sex as the individual in question
is that the divorce risk is increased by 41% (36%) for the female (male) workplace. These
￿nding are in accordance with ¯berg (2003) who also ￿nds signi￿cant e⁄ects for both
males and females. ¯berg (2003) ￿nds that the divorce risk is around 70% higher for an
individual who is the only representative of her or his gender in the workplace compared
to individuals who are surrounded by colleagues of same gender only. ¯berg (2003) dis-
cards cohabiting couples in her analysis. Restricting the sample to formally married, I
￿nd that the divorce risk is indeed higher if the female has more male colleagues (the
magnitude of the e⁄ect does not show signi￿cant changes for males) than in the regres-
sion combining cohabiting and married couples. Without knowing whether ¯berg (2003)
would ￿nd lower e⁄ects on divorce risk from workplace gender composition had she in-
cluded data on cohabiting couples, the pattern does suggest that the workplace is more
important in terms of on-the-job search the more formal the relationship is. In general,
cohabiting relationships are more fragile (the dissolution rate is around 70% smaller for
formally married couples than for those who cohabit), and their construction could very
well di⁄er from formal marriages (see e.g. Forste (2002) for a sociological view on the
di⁄erence). Continuing the speculation and combining with the observation that partner-
ship formation of the single individuals do not hinge on the availability of coworkers the
result tentatively suggests that the costs of on-the-job search increase from cohabitation
to marriage.
Again, I ￿nd that individuals with missing workplace information are less likely to
succeed in the marriage market. For these individuals, the dissolution risk is higher than
for individuals with workplace information. As mentioned previously, this group has
less favorable characteristics in terms of education and income ￿traits that also matter
in relation to the length of relationships, as is shown by the coe¢ cients of income and
education in Table 2.
Couples who, at the start of their relationship, share the same workplace are less likely
to break up. This result, together with the ￿nding that individuals are more likely to ￿nd
a partner at work if the sex ratio works in their favour, suggests that individuals tend
interaction e⁄ects between fraction of coworkers of opposite sex and number of coworkers to look for ￿rm
size e⁄ects. There turned out to be no statistical signi￿cant di⁄erence across ￿rm sizes so these results
are not presented in the paper, but are of course available upon request.
19to become more choosy when arrival rates increase. Of course, this presupposes that the
length of the partnership can be used as a proxy for quality of the partnership.
In sum, the results presented above suggest that workplace sex ratio matters for part-
nership dissolution. This is consistent with related studies on workplace composition
(¯berg (2003) and McKinnish (2004, 2006)) and also with studies that consider more
widely de￿ned local marriage markets (e.g. South & Lloyd (1995)). The result is also
consistent with a standard search model interpretation in the sense that an increase in
the arrival rate of alternative o⁄ers (typically) leads to higher exit rates out of the current
state17. On the other hand, the ￿nding could also be driven by action taken by individuals
who ￿nd themselves in a less successful relationship and in order to ￿nd a new partner,
look for employment in ￿rms that, besides employment, supply a variety of potential
marriage partners. In order to isolate this possibility of reverse causality from the e⁄ect
of sex ratio on dissolution risk, it would be preferable to have an exogenous shock to
workplace sex ratio to help identify the main hypothesis of this paper. Angrist (2002)
uses variation in immigrant ￿ ows to study the e⁄ect of immigrants￿marriage markets in
the US. A similar natural experiment setting is unfortunately not available in the data
set used in this analysis. Ideally, if the data set had information on unannounced work-
place merges that suddenly changed the workplace composition, this could be exploited
to obtain a cleaner measure of the e⁄ect of workplace sex ratio on dissolution risk. As an
approximation, I analyzed the dissolution pattern of couples who experience a change in
workplace sex ratio while working at the same workplace for three consecutive years. I
compare couples where the partners worked in the same workplace for three consecutive
years without experiencing substantial changes in workplace sex ratio to those who did
experience either an increase or decrease in the sex ratio. The reference category consists
of those who either do not have workplace information or who ￿nd a new job within three
years of employment. Clearly, this is a very rough approach since I have no idea whether
the changes that happen are expected. Also, I condition on relationships that last at least
3 years to identify the e⁄ect of changing sex ratio. Anyway, the results18 show no e⁄ect
of these changes if they occur at the male￿ s workplace and that both large increases and
17Further evidence on the association between arrival rates of marriage o⁄ers and divorce risk is given
in Gautier et al. (2006). Here we show that couples who move to a less dense area are less likely to
divorce than couples who stay in the larger cities of Denmark.
18The results are not presented in the paper, but are available upon request.
20decreases in sex ratio at the female￿ s workplace are associated with an increased risk of
dissolution compared to couples for whom the sex ratio stays pretty much constant over
the three preceding years. Taking at face value the fact that a drop in the sex ratio at the
female￿ s workplace correlates positively with dissolution risks does not support our main
hypothesis. On the other hand, it is obvious that this correlation can be generated from
other mechanisms than changes in the number of possible marriage partners. In fact, I
compare workplaces that experience rather large changes in composition to workplaces
that do not. The mere fact that these changes take place may generate tensions that spill
over into the personal life. Anyway, the procedure used does not guarantee a clear cut
identi￿cation result and the ￿ndings also suggest that this is not the case.
As suggested by McKinnish (2006), it could also be the case, that individuals who
work in industry-occupation cells with a high fraction of colleagues of the opposite sex
for some reason are more (or less) likely to divorce. To the extent that there exists a
correlation between workplace sex ratios and observable individual characteristics that
a⁄ect dissolution risk this should be captured by the inclusion of the other explanatory
variables in the dissolution hazard model. McKinnish (2006) addresses the possibility of
correlation between sex ratios and unobserved personal characteristics that might a⁄ect
dissolution both in terms of a ￿xed e⁄ects analysis and by IV techniques. As discussed
previously, neither of these elaborations change the main results in her analysis. This
suggests that even if endogeneity was an issue, the direction of the bias it causes is not
unambiguously determined. In the light of McKinnish (2006) and supported by the lack of
con￿dence in being able to ￿nd a good instrument for workplace sex ratios in the available
data set, I base my main conclusion of this paper on the results presented in Table 1 and
Table 219.
I have not estimated a competing risks speci￿cation of the partnership dissolution
model. First, I only observe one person from each relationship after dissolution (the
partner that is merged to the original sample is not followed after dissolution). That
is, a potential measure of whether a partnership ended because one (or both) of the
partner(s) formed a new relationship with a coworker is not perfect. Second, the number
of individuals who move from one relationship directly into a new relationship without an
19I will not discuss the results for the other explanatory variables in the partnership dissolution model.
The estimated coe¢ cients are to a large extent identical with results presented and discussed in Svarer
(2004) and Svarer & Verner (2006).
21intervening spell of singleness constitutes around 20% of the total number of dissolutions.
Of these around 10% are among coworkers from the same workplace and 13% among
coworkers from the same ￿rm. Hence, the number of transitions that would identify the
parameters in the cause-speci￿c transition rate into a new relationship with a coworker is
relatively small. If I condition availability of workplace information for both individuals
in the new relationship I ￿nd that 18% of the couples are colleagues. This implies that
the fraction of individuals who leave a partnership to form a new relationship with a
coworker is twice the size of the fraction of single individuals who form a partnership with
a colleague. Hence, the workplace indeed seems to constitute a more important marriage
market segment for individuals in partnerships than for single people.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper analyses the association between sex ratios at the workplace and marriage
market behavior. There is ample evidence that romantic encounters at the workplace
do happen. There are also several studies that document that the sex ratio in the local
marriage market matters for partnership formation and dissolution. The paper distinguish
between the e⁄ect of workplace sex ratios for partnership formation for single individuals
and for partnership dissolution for married or cohabiting individuals. For the latter group,
the workplace might constitute a more important marriage market segment due to higher
search costs in other segments. Hence, it is speculated that workplace sex ratios are more
important for partnership dissolution than for partnership formation among singles. The
results of this paper show that this is indeed the case.
A major challenge for future work in this area is to ￿nd exogenous variation in work-
place sex ratios in order to get a more clean picture of the causal e⁄ect of workplace sex
ratios and partnership formation and dissolution.
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